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This article's aim is to present several land-release principles for use in the battle-area clearance 
of Libya’s built-up areas, also called Urban Land Release. Based on the practical, empirical 
experience of DanChurchAid, it is not intended as a one-size-fits-all solution to BAC task 
planning, but it may be helpful in other locations when compared with local knowledge of 
the situation on the ground. It does not apply to landmine clearance. BAC is the traditional 
means of clearing unexploded ordnance in open areas. Libya is now contaminated with UXO 
and explosive remnants of war as a result of the uprising that occurred in 2011. This article also 
examines the effectiveness of BAC as reconstruction occurs, particularly in Misrata, based on 
the experience of DanChurchAid deminers.
by Robert Keeley [ RK Consulting, Ltd. ]
Urban Land Release in Libya: BAC and  
   Land Release in Built-up Areas 
Humanitarian mine action produces two main outputs with a socioeconomic impact. The first is land release for subsequent safe use by the local 
population. This is the main output of landmine clear-
ance and UXO clearance in areas contaminated by clus-
ter munitions where the local population is unwilling to 
use the contaminated areas.
The second main impact is that HMA reduces the risk 
of death or explosive remnants of war injury. HMA activ-
ities, such as mobile explosive ordnance disposal teams 
and mine-risk education, do not clear land for safe use 
but reduce the risk of death and ERW injury by removing 
hazards and modifying the behavior of the local popula-
tion, thereby reducing the probability of the incidence. 
Notably, the local population is rarely dissuaded from us-
ing areas by the threat of ERW. Hence, any HMA activi-
ties that are based on the land’s wholesale clearance are 
not likely to impact the livelihoods of the local popula-
tion, as people would have used the land anyway.
Amount of area cleared in hectares or square meters, 
while a useful measure of efficiency, is not a very useful 
measure of impact (see definitions in Table 1). Therefore, 
HMA teams operating in built-up areas should focus on 
activities optimized for ERW’s safe removal. Initially, this 
may appear the same as BAC, but it is important to un-
derstand that BAC is an area-clearance tool, and area-
clearance tools are used for hazard reduction. Although 
eventually effective—teams will find ERW—it is not al-
ways efficient, especially in situations where the density of 
ERW contamination is comparatively low.
Development Evaluation Criteria
A key concept referred to in this article is the develop-
ment-evaluation criteria created by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. Table 1 details 
these criteria and respective definitions.1 The most rele-
vant terms in this document are impact, effectiveness and 
efficiency.
Land Release and Non-technical Survey
The humanitarian mine-action sector still strug-
gles with defining the term land release. The Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has 
released three new International Mine Action Standards 
on the subject. Although a direct reference to “land re-
lease” is constrained to a single footnote in only one 
IMAS, a recent meeting of the IMAS Review Board de-
termined that considering a review of the relevant stan-
dards, IMAS 08.20–08.22, was still too soon.2 However, 
the mine-action sector’s general consensus is that infor-
mation-gathering and analysis techniques, such as Non-
technical Survey, should be used to prioritize the use of 
technical resources in landmine-contaminated areas and 
these actions should have some sort of socioeconomic im-
pact. Definitions of the three IMAS mentioned above are 
as follows:
•	 IMAS 08.20 defines Land Release:
“Land Release is the process of applying all reason-
able effort to identify or better define Confirmed 
Hazardous Area and remove all suspicion of mines/
ERW through non-technical survey, technical sur-
vey and clearance using an evidence based and doc-
umented approach.” 3
•	 IMAS 08.21 defines Non-technical Survey:
“The term ‘Non-technical Survey’ describes a... sur-
vey activity which involves collecting and analyzing 
new and/or existing information about a hazard-
ous area. Its purpose is to confirm whether there is 
evidence of a hazard or not, to identify the type and 
extent of hazards within any hazardous area and to 
define, as far as is possible, the perimeter of the actu-
al hazardous areas without physical intervention.” 4
•	 IMAS 04.10 defines Battle Area Clearance:
“The systematic and controlled clearance of hazard-
ous areas where the hazards are known not to in-
clude mines.” 5
Weapon Use in the Libyan Conflict
The fighting in Libya involved land-service ammu-
nition with some air-delivered weapons and small arms 
and light weapons. Air strikes on existing Libyan Army 
ammunition-storage areas have scattered abandoned ex-
plosive ordnance and SA/LW ammunition, and caused 
significant contamination in the surrounding areas. The 
majority of the fighting was concentrated along nodal 
points, coast roads and around sites of particular inter-
est, such as government buildings within town centers. 
Therefore, significant damage occurred in some areas, 
whereas other areas escaped unharmed.6
BAC in Libya
In Libya, much of the early humanitarian clearance 
work was conducted as the fighting continued and re-
volved around the BAC of urban areas, particularly in 
Misrata. Early work by international nongovernmental 
organizations showed that although a number of unex-
ploded ordnance was identified, the amount was far less 
than what might be expected given the intense fighting. 
By talking to locals, it was learned that the local forces 
engaged in some informal UXO removal. 
Although BAC can be conducted faster than demin-
ing, especially when it involves surface-visual clearance 
on hard surfaces, it remains slow and expensive. Clearing 
a city takes considerable time; the Joint Mine Action 
Coordination Team was originally tasked with clearing 
Misrata. The operation’s relative costs and benefits were 
brought into particular focus given that a smaller-than-
expected quantity of UXO was found. Therefore, it should 
be considered whether the principles of the emerging 
Criterion De nition
Relevance  e extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of 
the target group, recipient and donor
Impact  e positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, 
directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.  is involves the main impacts 
and e ects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environ-
mental and other development indicators.
E ectiveness A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.
E  ciency E  ciency measures the outputs—qualitative and quantitative—in relation to 
the inputs. It is an economic term which signi es that the aid uses the least 
costly resources possible to achieve the desired results.  is generally requires 
comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see if the 
most e  cient process has been adopted.
Sustainability Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the bene ts of an activity 
are likely to continue a er donor funding has been withdrawn.
Table 1. OECD Development Evaluation Criteria.
All tables courtesy of the author.
Examining UXO found during a BAC task. The item was 
hard to spot and is likely to have been missed by a previ-
ous search.
All photos courtesy of the author.
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land-release concepts can be employed when focus-
ing BAC efforts into areas containing UXO contamina-
tion and where its removal will have some socioeconomic 
impact.
Risk and Hazard. The discussions below depend on 
a mutual understanding of the formal definitions of risk 
and hazard, as follows:
•	 IMAS 04.10 defines risk as the “combination of the 
probability of occurrence of harm and the severity 
of that harm.”7
•	 IMAS 04.10 also defines a hazard as a “potential 
source of harm.”8
This is usually described mathematically as: r=PixSo 
where r = risk, Pi  equals the probability of the incidence 
and So  is the severity of the outcome. In mine-action terms, 
risk can also be seen as a product of hazard x activity.
This means that removing the hazard can reduce the 
risk, or reducing the probability of an incident by modi-
fying people’s behavior (i.e., with mine-risk education). 
However, the converse must also be true: Risk is not actu-
ally reduced when work is done to search areas that are sub-
sequently found never to have had ERW contamination.
ERW and Casualties
One problem facing the HMA sector involves how to 
measure the impact of EOD teams, given that they do 
not clear land. The more UXO that is safely removed, the 
safer the population. However, measuring the produc-
tive value of cleared land is not so simple. Estimating the 
impact of EOD teams and UXO removal is possible, and 
an established mathematical relationship now links the 
number of UXO and the number of casualties.9 A mathe-
matical function involves the percentage of ammunition 
that becomes UXO (commonly understood to be 10 per-
cent), the percentage of UXO considered unsafe to move 
(and hence most likely to cause casualties) and the av-
erage number of UXO casualties per incident. In other 
words, the more ammunition used in a particular area, 
the more UXO that will remain in the area. As a result, 
more casualties will occur.
Any land-release technique forcing the HMA teams 
to concentrate on maximum-impact areas will improve 
efficiency and will have more of an impact on donor 
funds. This has already occurred in Libya. Although 
Misrata was one of the most heavily contaminated areas 
in Libya, some areas did not see combat, and identifying 
Misrata’s contamination was the first step in this iden-
tification process. By using local knowledge and infor-
mation about the conduct of the fighting (see Figure 1), 
teams can improve this process. Other procedures can 
further focus the teams’ attention on the areas where the 
fighting was heaviest.
UXO Scrap, Damage and Fragmentation
A simple proxy indicator of the probable density of 
ERW contamination will be the density of UXO scrap, 
which can be moved and is likely to decrease over time, 
and weapon damage to buildings, which includes frag-
mentation marks. This is a simple statement of pro-
portion: The amount of fighting is proportional to the 
amount of building damage. Since the amount of ERW 
and the amount of fragmentation damage are both pro-
portional to the severity of the fighting, using fragmen-
tation as an indicator of ERW presence is statistically 
reasonable. As a general principle, one exploding weap-
on causes spalling/cratering over approximately one 
square meter (one square yard) and significant amounts 
of smaller fragmentation damage over an area of 100 sq 
m (120 sq yd).10
Experience From Misrata
Practical experience from Misrata supports a number 
of observations:
•	 Fragmentation and battle damage is distributed 
around the foci of conflict. It is possible to see a 
distribution of contamination around areas of 
most severe fighting which is similar to a statisti-
cal distribution. This appears to be a result of the 
nature of the fighting in Misrata. When walking a 
few meters away from severely damaged areas, no 
damage is observable in parts of the town. This dis-
tribution is represented graphically in Figure 2. 
•	 Items of UXO are strongly correlated with frag-
mentation and battle damage. In general, the 
presence of UXO is very strongly correlated with 
the degree of observed battle damage. No items 
of UXO were found in areas without battle dam-
age. The correlation with other ERW items, espe-
cially caches of abandoned ordnance, might be less 
strong, as ammunition stockpiles may be found 
away from conflict areas.
•	 Far fewer ERW are being found than the amount 
of battle damage might suggest. This lack of ERW 
is one key observation from the ground in Misrata. 
Looking at a building with 20-plus projectile 
strikes, one or two UXO items may be found in or 
around the building, but what was actually found 
on the ground was far fewer. Indeed the UXO-
contamination level around the foci of fighting 
is estimated to be only about 10 percent of what 
might be found (i.e., one UXO for every five to 10 
buildings searched). This is not because the am-
munition used was particularly reliable; rather, in-
formation given to DCA suggests that local teams 
within the Libyan Transitional National Council 
collected ERW items before DCA (and indeed the 
other international NGO team working in Libya) 
could deploy. Seemingly, DCA teams are finding 
items missed by these original searchers. In con-
ditions of such low contamination, making EOD/
BAC interventions more efficient is even more im-
portant. Table 2 sets out performance data for DCA 
teams in Misrata for August 2011. This was effec-
tively the first month of operations, and some days 
at the end of the month included a stand-down in 
preparation for the Eid al-Fitr holiday. These data 
give benchmarks by which any subsequent change 
in procedures can be measured.
Figure 2. Distribution of battle damage around the focus of the fighting. The red line is a representation of how the 
density of damage is distributed across the battle area.
Illustration courtesy of the author/CISR.
The amount of UXO scrap found by a team of three search-
ers in one hour. UXO was subsequently found on the roof 
of a building in this same area by the team later that day.
An area showing more moderate damage. Much of the 
damage to this building is from fires rather than from 
the blast or fragmentation effects of UXO. A small num-
ber of UXO items were found in the buildings pictured.
Ser Datum Uncontrolled
1 Days worked 17
2 Area Cleared (Ha) 66.64
3 Items found 81
4 Area cleared per day (Ha) 3.92
5 UXO per day 4.76
6 UXO per Ha 1.22
Table 2. DCA BAC Data for August 2011.
An example of low amounts of battle damage. No 
items of UXO were found around this building.
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Severe Signi cant or total collapse reulting from 
repeated strikes. Signi cant amount of frag-
mentation or SA/LW strike damage
Can be harder to search than build-
ings with moderate damage
Moderate Some strikes on buildings resulting in notice-
able damage, but no general collapse. Frag-
mentations or SA/LW strike damage present.
Light Some fragmentation marks on buildings. No 
signi cant damage.
Nil No visible battle damage




Nil Reactive call-out only to spot tasks such as 
abandoned explosive ordnance or caches of 
SA/LW ammunition. Do not carry out pro-
phylactic BAC.
Light As per Nil. In the event that some UXO re-
ported then ‘clear to fade.’
Moderate ‘Clear to fade’ if UXO reported or ‘clear to 
boundary’ (of project) if area required in 
support of a funded development project. 
Clear as prophylactic BAC task when no 
severe areas le .
Severe Carry out BAC tasks on severe areas as prior-
ity when no EOD spot tasks reported. Clear 
to fade.
Consider mechanical assistance for 
searching rubble.
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Al Mazasba Al Rwesat





Iron and steel factories
Figure 1. Wikipedia map of the battle of Misrata.
Map courtesy of Wikipedia/CISR.
Priority De nition Contamination Impact Remarks
Priority 
One




BAC in support of funded devel-
opment project
X Strong in terms of potential 
impact. Moderate and severe 
areas only except where clear-
ance is speci cally funded.
Priority 
 ree
BAC in ‘Severe’ areas X Most likely to be contaminat-




BAC in other areas Consider relocating some 
teams to other regions if too 
many P4 tasks being under-
taken.
Table 5. Prioritization in Urban HMA.
Categorizing Explosive Fragmentation 
Battle Damage
If the above principles are operationalized for prac-
tical use in urban land release, identifying different cat-
egories of battle damage will be useful; this information 
could then be used to prioritize efforts and identify dif-
ferent technical interventions. This should assist in im-
proving the allocation of resources to the problem and 
improve efficiency.
In Misrata, four categories of battle damage were 
identified. These are explained in Table 3.
Limitations
One apparent limitation of using battle-damage evidence 
to cancel areas for BAC is that the outliers, i.e., the one-off 
item of UXO that was the only explosive-ordnance item 
to fall in an area of light or nil battle damage will not be 
found. Nor will this method find ERW caches in areas 
where no immediate fighting occurred.
The technique described is purely a method for cat-
egorizing buildings and surrounding areas based on the 
degree of battle damage. While this method is consid-
ered a useful means of categorizing areas, other data-
gathering methods exist. For example, local knowledge 
may also highlight one-off ERW items (since abandoned 
ordnance is less likely to be as closely correlated with bat-
tle damage as is UXO) or identify buildings that were oc-
cupied by fighters but were less damaged. Table 4 shows 
how other factors can be incorporated as part of a re-
source-allocation process in urban land release.
On the other hand, BAC will not find all ERW in 
built-up areas. It will not work in abandoned or locked 
buildings, and even the best BAC searchers will not be 
likely to spot UXO in unusual locations. We know that 
from World War I and World War II small numbers of 
UXO plague Europe long after the wars. Therefore, as-
suming BAC activities in built-up areas have a risk-re-
duction output rather than area clearance is important. 
ERW reports can be used to modify the default-option 
response, which the damage category suggests.
Prioritization
The principles set out previously can prioritize HMA 
assets between EOD spot tasks and wide-ranging BAC 
tasks in built-up areas. Table 5 provides prioritization 
guidelines; these compare the type of task with likely at-
tributes of contamination and impact. This can help de-
termine whether multi-purpose HMA teams deploy as 
small, mobile EOD teams or should combine for area-
clearance tasks.
Other Techniques
Marking. Not all abandoned buildings are freely ac-
cessible, which may mean that not all severely damaged 
buildings can be cleared during urban BAC activity, and 
some contamination may not be found during prophy-
lactic BAC searches. Improving BAC effectiveness in 
terms of contamination and impact is possible by the 
use (in Libya) of simple add-on stickers in Arabic and 
English, including a message similar to that in Figure 3.11 
These stickers should help improve the impact of HMA 
activity and will help the local population when they en-
counter ERW.
Human information. As implied in Table 4, collect-
ing human information will be important. Using com-
munity-liaison teams to seek out human input on ERW 
is critical. MRE can help facilitate this but only when 
it includes information about how suspect ERW can be 
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reported. MRE is more useful when a feedback loop is 
incorporated. Like the stickers on abandoned buildings, 
human input will help improve the impact of HMA ac-
tivity as it will help the local population confront ERW.
Clearing to Fade. Clearing to fade is a concept where-
by BAC teams search outward from ERW-contamination 
areas until they find no more contamination. Based on 
DCA’s experience in Misrata, the approximate mean 
distance between UXO (in contaminated areas) is 25 
m (27 yd). Therefore, the clearing-to-fade distance rec-
ommended here is 50 m (55 yd), or twice the average 
distance between UXO pieces in contaminated areas. 
Teams stop at least 50 m (55 yd) beyond the most recent-
ly found piece of UXO. The distance can be increased 
when practical, e.g., to extend the search by a few me-
ters to allow a wall or road junction to act as a boundary. 
Independent Confirmation
Produced by the French NGO Agency for Technical 
Cooperation and Development (ACTED), a map served 
as independent confirmation of this hypothesis (see aer-
ial photo, next page). In order to plan possible aid in-
terventions, this map showed battle-damage areas after 
an ACTED survey. Based on DCA’s work conducted in 
August, the UXO data was superimposed on this map 
to show a high degree of correlation between UXO finds 
and battle damage. The few outliers are marked; they 
were explained previously.
Resource Allocation Through  
Response-time Analysis
The information contained in Figure 5 is based on an 
approach called response-time analysis used by a num-
ber of countries, including Australia and the United 
Kingdom. Under such an approach, an average response 
time is set as a standard by the appropriating authority. 
This would be the expected time between an item of UXO 
Figure 3. Message to occupiers of a building in Misrata that could not be searched.
being reported to the implementing agency and its mo-
bile EOD team arriving to deal with the suspect item.
Given the time necessary to deal with an average find 
after the team arrives on site, and typical travel times 
between two separate locations, one could expect each 
team to deal with two separate UXO tasks each working 
day. This process allows analysis using the principles set 
out in Figure 5 (previous page).
This analysis can be carried out at a program level 
to determine whether there are sufficient EOD teams 
in the country, and repeated at a project level to estab-
lish whether the capacity is allocated efficiently between 
provinces or regions. Can you spot the UXO? This neighborhood has no readily identifiable fragmentation or battle damage, yet apparently 
has UXO, as reported to DCA by a neighbor. It is unlikely to have been spotted by BAC.
A DCA searcher checks severe damage to a building. 
The building includes a great deal of blast damage and 
collapse in some areas. An item of UXO was found on 
the roof of this building. The pink shaded area on the map was produced by Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development to 
show battle-damaged areas in Misrata. The red marks show where UXO was found by DCA in August 2011.
To the occupier:
A search of the area around this building has been carried out for dangerous explosive items, 
but access to this property was not possible. If subsequently you find any items that you suspect 
might be an explosive item, contact us at [telephone number] and we will check it for you as soon 
as possible.
Please DO NOT touch the item yourself and please also make sure that no one else touches it 
in the meantime. Do not become a casualty.
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Top left. DCA teams working around "Severe" damaged buildings. Top right. An MRE poster provided by Handicap International. Center and 
bottom. This cluster munition was reported to DCA by a resident who could see it on the garage of his neighbor’s house. It would have been 
missed by BAC teams who would not have been granted access to the house, and it would not have been spotted by the householder as 
there is no view over the garage from the house.
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•	 If EOD teams are each carrying out an average of two tasks per day and there is no backlog of tasks, then 
the number of teams available can be considered sufficient and their management efficient.
•	 If EOD teams are carrying out an average of two tasks per day and there is a backlog of tasks, then the 
number of teams available may be insufficient, even if they are being managed efficiently.
•	 If EOD teams are carrying out less than two tasks per day and there is no backlog of tasks, then there may 
be too many teams available (or a problem in the task reporting process).
•	 If EOD teams are carrying out less than two tasks per day and there is a backlog of tasks, then it is likely 
that the teams are being managed inefficiently.
Figure 5. Principles for EOD response-time analysis.
Conclusion
BAC is traditionally used in open areas and is conven-
tionally considered a means to release land for subse-
quent safe use. DCA’s experience in Libya in 2011, 
specifically in Misrata, suggests that BAC may not always 
be an efficient way of achieving a socioeconomic impact 
due to a number of confounding factors. These include 
the underestimated amount of UXO found and the large 
number of buildings not accessible to searchers. However, 
findings from initial DCA operations show a strong cor-
relation between the degree of battle damage and the 
amount of UXO found. Therefore, using the degree of 
battle damage—supported by reports from the local pop-
ulation—should allow searchers to focus on reported 
ERW and on areas where ERW are most likely found 
within an urban land-release concept. Urban land release 
will not find all ERW, especially items of abandoned ord-
nance not found in the close proximity of battle areas. 
However, the comparatively small number of ERW found 
using conventional BAC reveals the importance of focus-
ing activities in areas where ERW are most likely found. 
Support from enhanced MRE and community-liaison ef-
forts will further improve the efficiency and impact of 
humanitarian mine-action activities in built-up areas. 
Acknowledgements: This paper could not have been 
developed without input from all of DanChurchAid’s 
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see endnotes page 81
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